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Instructions
Lattice-based cryptography is a promising alternative to cryptography based on factorization or discrete
logarithm problem since neither classical nor quantum algorithm is currently known that would effectively
solve general instances of hard lattice problems. The aim of this work is to get acquainted with lattice-based
cryptosystems (NTRU in particular) and to investigate lattice reduction techniques.
In particular, the student will
- study mathematical background underlying lattice-based cryptography and give its thorough description
- investigate orthogonalization methods used in lattice reduction algorithms and their symplectic versions
presented in paper [1]
- compare the performance of standard and symplectic orthogonalization algorithms using randomly
generated NTRU lattices.
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Abstrakt
V tejto praci sme sa zamerali na matematicky popis NTRU kryptosystemu
zalozenemu na tazkom probleme na bodovej mriezke a otestujeme viacero or-
togonalizacnych algoritmov popsanych v praci od Nicolasa Gamu nad malymi
bodovymi mriezkami.
Klcova slova NTRU, symplekticka, mriezka, ortogonalizace, Eigen
Abstract
In this thesis we study the underlying mathematical principles that are funda-
mental for lattice-based cryptosystem, namely NTRU. We have benchmarked
algorithms proposed by Nicolas Gama, et al. on a low-dimensional NTRU
matrices.
Keywords NTRU, symplectic, lattice, orthogonalisation, Eigen
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Introduction
In the past decades quantum computing got into the real world implementa-
tion and it quickly became the very promising way of computing and solving
the very hard problems of computer science threatening the online security.
Scientists have developed many cryptosystems, one of which is called
NTRU introduced in 1996 by Jerey Hostein, Joseph H. Silverman and Jill
Pipher. The NTRU is a lattice-based cryptosystem which falls into the cat-
egory of post-quantum cryptography.
Post-quantum cryptography is a new branch cryptography primarily fo-
cused on a set of cryptosystems that are resistant to quantum computing.
The NTRU cryptosystem is based on searching the problem of shortest
vector in a given lattice, namely NTRU lattice, in contrast to the RSA or
ElGamal which are based on factorisation or discrete logarithm problems and
they are susceptible to the power of quantum computing.
The search for the shortest vector in a lattice was proven to be NP-hard
problem and there are no quantum or classical algorithms known to solve this
problem.
All algorithms mentioned in my work serve as ways of solving such a prob-
lem, the most notable are Gram-Schmidt or Cholesky, but We will inspect
their symplectic and dual versions which may improve their performance.
I have decided to study this area of cutting edge post-quantum crypto-
graphy because of the all new concepts, new approaches to cryptography and
cybersecurity.
I will explore the mathematical background of a lattice-based crypto-
graphy, especially a group of orthogonalization algorithms and their symplectic
versions, which are very closely related to the NTRU cryptosystem.
This thesis is based on the research paper of Nicholas Gama, et al. who
applied the orthogonalization algorithms on the symplectic lattices which are
proportional to the NTRU lattices.
1

Chapter 1
Theory of lattices
1.1 Background and Motivation
The NTRU cryptosystem, introduced by mathematicians Jerey Hostein,
Joseph H. Silverman and Jill Pipher in 1996 is based on NP-hard problem
of nding the shortest vector in a given high-dimensional lattice. The prob-
lem is not related to already established factorization or discrete logarithm
problem, which are susceptible to Shor's algorithm.[1]
Denition 1 (Lattice). Let B = (b1;b2; : : : ;bn) be a n-tuple of linearly in-
dependent vectors in Rm. The lattice  generated by B is a set of all integral
linear combinations
 (B) =
(
nX
i=1
ibi : i 2 Z
)
:
We say that n-tuple B is a basis of a lattice  and basis vectors B generate
a lattice .
In general, lattice can occupy a m-dimensional vector space, but it can be
of a lower dimension n (m > n). In that case, lattice rank is n, and lattice
dimension is m. If m = n then lattice is full rank.
Denition 2 (Basis matrix of a lattice). Let B = (b1;b2; : : : ;bn) be a n-tuple
of linearly independent vectors in Rm generating a lattice . We can describe
a lattice  by a nm matrix B as (B) = fvB : v 2 Zmg : The basis matrix
of a lattice B is constructed by placing basis vectors bi into rows.
Denition 3 (Inner product). Let a;b 2 Rm, then inner product is a map
h; i : Rm  Rm 7! R dened as ha;bi = Pmi=1 aibi or written in the vector
notation as abT . Vectors a;b 2 Rm are orthogonal if and only if ha;bi = 0:
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b1
b2
Figure 1.1: An example of a lattice (points) generated by vectors b1;b2
Throughout the thesis we will use kk to refer the standard Euclidean
norm, which is dened as kak =pha;ai.
Now, before we dive deeper into the properties of lattices, we shall intro-
duce a unimodular matrices and their relation to the lattices.
Remark. General linear group of degree n is the set of all n n invertible
matrices over eld F : GLn(F) = fM 2 Fn;n : matrix is invertibleg : Especially,
the set of all n  n invertible matrices over eld F with determinant of 1:
SLn(F) = fM 2 GLn(F) : detM = 1g :
Lemma 1 (Unimodular matrix). Let U 2 GLn(Z), We say that matrix U
is unimodular if and only if detU = 1.
Theorem 1 (Properties of unimodular matrix). Let U;V be unimodular matrices.
Then the following holds
 U 1 is unimodular,
 UV and VU are unimodular.
Lemma 2. Let B be a n m basis matrix of a lattice  where m > n then
there is a linear map P : Rm 7! Rn dened by a matrix P 2 Rm;n such that
P is a lattice of rank n and 8v 2  : kPvk = kvk and for all 1  i < j 
n : hvi;vji = hviP;vjPi.
If the linear map is represented by a mn matrix P then a matrix for the
image of  under the projection P is the n n matrix BP which is invertible.
This lemma proves the existence of a projection which projects the a lattice
from Rm to Rn, making the projected lattice a full rank lattice. The projection
preserves the Euclidean norm.
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Lemma 3. Two n  m matrices B1, B2 generate the same lattice  if and
only if B1 and B2 are related by unimodular n  n matrix U. Specically,
B1 = UB2.
I will leave out the proof, but this lemma proves the existence of a unim-
odular matrix U such that U 1B1 = B2.
Denition 4 (Integral lattice). A lattice is integral (or integer) if and only
if all vectors of its basis have integral entries.
Because of the nature of computers it will be benecial to base our cryp-
tography around integers and integral basis vectors of a lattice to avoid oper-
ations on oating point numbers as much as possible, as they may introduce
rounding errors in computations.
Also, it is clear that we can represent a lattice as a set of points in a vector
space, or as a set of vectors, and we will do so interchangeably.
Denition 5 (Determinant of a lattice). Let  be a lattice generated by vectors
(b1; : : : ;bn) 2 Rm. Then the determinant of , denoted as det is the value
of jdetBPj where P is the projection matrix.
Lemma 4 (Independence of a basis). The determinant of a lattice is inde-
pendent of the choice of basis matrix B and the choice of projection P .
Lemma 5 (Hadamard's inequality). Let  be a lattice, take any basis (b1; : : : ;bn)
for  and then
det = jdetBPj  kb1k : : : kbnk :
Denition 6 (Hadamard ratio). Let (b1; : : : ;bn) be a basis of a lattice ,
then we dene the following quantity
H(b1; : : : ;bn) =

det
kb1k : : : kbnk
1=n
and call it Hadamard ratio.
The Hadamard ratio ranges as 0 < H(b1; : : : ;bn)  1 and it serves
us as a good measure of orthogonalization.
Denition 7 (Gram matrix). Let (b1; : : : ;bn) be a set of vectors. Then
matrix G 2 Rn;n is Gramian 8i; j 2 1; : : : ; n : Gi;j = hbi;bji or written
as a matrix G = VVT where V is a matrix of vectors b1; : : : ;bn written in
rows. We will refer to Gram matrix of (b1; : : : ;bn) as G(b1; : : : ;bn):
We will attribute a volume to a lattice is using the following theorem which
will be useful later.
Theorem 2 (Volume of a lattice). Let  be a lattice described by the basis
matrix (b1; : : : ;bn) then we can attribute a volume to a lattice  as follows
vol(b1; : : : ;bn) =
p
detG(b1; : : : ;bn)
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1.2 Lattice problems
I will list most notable variants of the NP-hard problems on a lattice, but
the fundamental are the rst two problems. The symbol 0 represents the zero
vector of Rm.
Denition 8 (The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)). Find the shortest nonzero
vector in a given lattice , more specically, minimize the Euclidean norm
min
v2nf0g
kvk :
Such vector is a solution to the shortest vector problem.
Denition 9 (The Closest Vector Problem (CVP)). Given a vector w 2 Rn,
which does not lie in a lattice , nd the shortest nonzero vector in a lattice 
that is the closest to the vector w. More specically, minimize the Euclidean
norm
min
v2nf0g
kv  wk :
Such vector is a solution to the closest vector problem.
Denition 10 (The Approximate Shortest Vector Problem (apprSVP)). Let
 be a a lattice of dimension n and (n) be a function of n, nd a nonzero
vector v in a lattice  that is no more than (n) times longer than the shortest
nonzero vector:
v  (n) kvshortestk :
Vector v is a solution to the approximate shortest vector problem.
Denition 11 (The Approximate Closest Vector Problem (apprCVP)). Given
a vector w 2 Rn, which does not lie in a lattice , nd the closest nonzero
vector in a lattice  that is no more than (n) times longer than the closest
to the vector w
v  (n) kvclosest  wk :
Vector v is a solution to the approximate closest vector problem.
However, there might be more than one solution to the problem. For
example, a lattice described by the following basis f(1; 0; 0); (0; 1; 0); (0; 0; 1)g
has three shortest vectors, each of them has the minimal Euclidean norm and
every vector suces as a solution to the problem.
Lemma 6 (Gaussian heuristic). Let N be a dimension of a lattice . The
Gaussian expected shortest length is
() =
r
N
2e
(det)1=N :
The Gaussian heuristic says that a shortest nonzero vector in a randomly
generated lattice will satisfy
kvshortestk  ():
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1.3 Solving the SVP and CVP in a lattice
Let  be a full rank lattice described by the orthogonal basis (b1;b2; : : : ;bn) 2
Rn, i.e. such that hbi;bji = 0 for all i 6= j and we want to solve the SVP and
CVP on this particular lattice.
If basis vectors are orthogonal it's easy to solve the SVP and CVP. Every
vector v 2  has the length given by the following formula
kvk2 = hv;vi = ha1b1 + a2b2 +   + anbn; a1b1 + a2b2 +   + anbni =
= a21hb1;b1i+ a22hb2;b2i+   + a2nhbn;bni =
= a21 kb1k2 + a22 kb2k2 +   + a2n kbnk2 :
Since a1; a2; : : : ; an 2 Z then the shortest nonzero vector(s) are in the set
of orthogonal basis fb1;b2; : : : ;bng.
In order to solve the CVP problem in a lattice  We will follow similar
argument. Let wn 2 Rn such that
wn = s1b1 + s2b2 +   + snbn where s1; s2; : : : ; sn 2 R:
Then for the vector w 2  where w = a1b1 + a2b2 +   + anbn we have
kv  wk2 = (a1   s1)2 kb1k2 + (a2   s2)2 kb2k2 +   + (an   sn)2 kbnk2 :
Because a1; a2; : : : ; an are required to be integers, the given norm is min-
imised, if we take each ai to be the closest integer to si. Thus solution to the
CVP problem is a vector v =
Pn
i=1bs1ebi where be is rounding to the nearest
integer.
b1
b2
(a) An example of a \bad basis"
b1 b2
(b) An example of a \good basis"
Figure 1.2: Two dierent bases for the same lattice
Therefore solving the SVP and CVP is trivial once the basis of a lattice
is orthogonal. We will demonstrate the underlying CVP problem in R2 geo-
metrically on a simple example where we compare a \good basis" with a \bad
basis" (Figure 1.2).
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If we try to solve the CVP with a \bad basis" we will not nd the correct
solution as it is pictured in Figure 1.3. It will miss the closest lattice point
and the problem grows with the rank of a lattice.
Target point
Closest lattice point
Closest vertex
Figure 1.3: An example of a bad solution
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Orthogonalization algorithms
As we have seen, orthogonalization of a lattice solves the SVP and CVP.
However, orthogonalization algorithms described in this section serve as un-
derlying layer across linear algebra helping to solve many related computation
problems.
Any orthogonalization, given a set of vectors (b1; : : : ;bn) will ompute the
set of vectors (b1; : : : ;bn) such that every pair of vectors (hbi ;bj i = 0 for all
i 6= j) is orthogonal.
In this section we will introduce a list of orthogonalization algorithms
namely Gram-Schmidt, Lagrange-Gauss, Cholesky and others. We will refer
to [2, 3, 4] as the basis for the analysis of mentioned algorithms.
2.1 Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization
The Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization (GSO) algorithm works iteratively on
a set of n m-dimensional vectors (b1; : : : ;bn) which components are in any
eld. The rst step is to proclaim the vector b1 as already \orthogonal".
Next step is to project the second vector b2 onto the vector b1 and similarly
orthogonally projecting k-th vector onto all previous k   1 vectors which has
been orthogonalized in previous steps.
We dene the projection of a vector v onto u as a map Rn  Rn 7! Rn :
proju(v) =
hv;ui
kuk2 u; (2.1)
such map outputs a vector. Computing
v2 = v2   projv1(v2)
produces a vector v2 which is orthogonal to v1.
9
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v1
v2
v?1v

2
Figure 2.1: A projection of vector v2 onto the orthogonal vector v
?
1 of v1
Algorithm 1 Gram-Schmidt algorithm
1: procedure Gram-Schmidt(b1; : : : ;bn 2 Rm)
2: b1  b1
3: for k = 2 upto n do
4: dk  
Pk 1
i=1 b

i hbk;bi i = kbi k2
5: bk  bk   dk
6: end for
7: return (b1; : : : ;bn)
8: end procedure
Please note, that throughout this thesis we will refer to matrices as a list
of vectors. Matrices are constructed constructed row-wise, if it's not said
otherwise.
Algorithm 1 returns a set of vectors that are orthogonal to each other,
provides the result in O(mn4 log2(X)) operations where X is the upper bound
of kbik for all i such that 1  i  n.
However Classic GSO is not the best algorithm for the lattice reduction
as it is generally numerically unstable in oating point arithmetic. When
dealing with vectors over Zn in an exact arithmetic in Q the integers may
grow very large. It is commonly referred as coecient explosion.
Also under a closer inspection we can notice that we can express the GSO
as a matrix equation as follows
B = B;
where  2 GLn(R) is a lower triangular matrix, B is the \input" basis and B
is the orthogonalized \output" basis. The matrix  has 1 on the diagonal and
under diagonal are the coecients of the projection k;i = hbk;bi i= kbi k2 for
all i < k. We will exploit this relation in the following section.
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2.2 Integral Gram-Schmidt
Integral GSO constructed in the paper [5, p. 7] is specically built for the
\input" basis vectors in Zm. In that case the bi and i;j are in general
rational. To avoid rational arithmetic we will use integral quantities, namely
matrix  2 GLn(Z), for all 1  i  n: let 0;0 = 1 and i;i =
Qi
j=1 kbjk2 =
vol(b1; : : : ;bi)
2 2 Z and let the i;j = i;jj;j for all j < i.
Recall the GSO algorithm where we computed i;j as hbi;bj i=kbjk2. Mul-
tiplying it j;j we obtain i;j = hbi;bj ij 1;j 1 2 Z .
All steps lead us to replace the  matrix with integral lower triangular
matrix  which allows us eciently compute the lower triangular  matrix
(i;j = i;j=j;j), if necessary. For lattice reduction purposes  suces matrix
well enough.
Algorithm 2 Integral Gram-Schmidt algorithm
1: procedure IntegralGram-Schmidt(b1; : : : ;bn 2 Zm )
2: for i = 1 upto n do
3: i;1  hbi;b1i
4: for j = 2 upto i do
5: S = i;1j;1
6: for k = 2 upto j   1 do
7: S  (k;kS + j;ki;k)=k 1;k 1
8: end for
9: i;j  hbi;bjij 1;j 1   S
10: end for
11: end for
12: return 
13: end procedure
Time complexity of the algorithm 2 is O(mn2 log2jBj) where jBj is an
upper bound of kbik .
2.3 Lagrange-Gauss lattice reduction
For a lattice of a dimension of 2 there exists a very ecient algorithm with
solves the SVP and returns a \good basis" for the given lattice. This algorithm
was published by Gauss, but was known to Lagrange.
This algorithm however does not work for higher dimensions. If we had
a lattice of a rank n (n > 2), we would have to nd the right linear combination
(Algorithm 3, line 6) for a vector bn in a lattice of a rank n   1 generated
by vectors (b1; : : : ;bn 1) which leads us to the search for the solution of the
CVP.
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It's very similar to the Classical GSO with two nuances, the rst being
the swapping of a larger vector with the smaller one (in the comparison of the
two norms) and the second one is rounding to the nearest integer.
The following algorithm executes O(log3 n) operations.
Algorithm 3 Lagrange-Gauss Lattice Reduction
1: procedure Lagrange-Gauss(b1;b2 2 R2 )
2: while true do
3: if kb2k < kb1k then
4: swap b1 $ b2
5: end if
6:  = bhb1;b2i= kb1k2e
7: if  = 0 then
8: return (b1;b2)
9: end if
10: b2  b2   b1
11: end while
12: end procedure
2.4 Cholesky decomposition
Cholesky decomposition is a symmetric version to more general LU decompos-
ition where L is lower triangular matrix and U is an upper triangular matrix.
Cholesky decomposition requires B 2 Rn;n to be a symmetric denite positive
matrix then there exists a lower triangular matrix L 2 Rn;n with strictly posit-
ive diagonal such that B = LLT . Algorithm returns only the lower triangular
matrix L. It's also important to note that orthogonalization is hidden in the
following fact that B(L 1).
We will derive the algorithm from the denition of the Cholesky decom-
position. A simple decomposition example in R3;3:
0@a11 a12 a13a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33
1A =
0@l11 0 0l21 l22 0
l31 l32 l33
1A0@l11 l21 l310 l22 l32
0 0 l33
1A
The resulting matrix is as follows
0@a11 a12 a13a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33
1A =
0@ l211 l21l11 l31l11l21l11 l221 + l222 l31l21 + l32l22
l31l11 l31l21 + l32l22 l
2
31 + l
2
32 + l
2
33
1A :
12
2.5. DT factorization
2.4.1 Generalisation of Cholesky decomposition
Let L 2 GLn(R) be a symmetric denite positive matrix. Every coecient
can be computed iteratively, for all 1  k  n computed as follows:
lkk =
vuutakk   k 1X
i=1
l2ki
and coecients under the main diagonal can be computed as
(8i : 1; : : : ; n) (8k : k < n) : lik = 1
lkk
 
aik  
k 1X
i=1
lijlkj
!
:
The following algorithm executes O(mn2) operations.
Algorithm 4 Cholesky decomposition
1: procedure Cholesky-Decomposition(b1; : : : ;bn 2 Rn)
2: for i = 1 upto n do
3: for j = 1 upto i do
4: if i = j then
5: lij  
q
bii  
Pi 1
m=1 l
2
im
6: else
7: s Pi 1i=1 lijlkj
8: lij  (bik   s)=lkk
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: return L
13: end procedure
2.5 DT factorization
The DT factorization mentioned in the work of Gama [5] is based on an
matrix LDLT factorization, where given matrix A can be expressed as a mul-
tiplication of three matrices, where L;M are lower triangular matrices and
D = diag(d1; d2; : : : ; dn), such that A = LDMT .
If matrix A is symmetric then we can save some eort using a variant of
LDMT called LDLT factorization, showing that M = L.
The couple (;D) is a DT factorization of A. Similarly as in the case
of Cholesky, we will derive the algorithm from a simple example. We want to
factorise a matrix into three matrices such that0@a11 a12 a13a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33
1A =
0@ 1 0 0l21 1 0
l31 l32 1
1A0@d11 0 00 d22 0
0 0 d33
1A0@1 l21 l310 1 l32
0 0 1
1A
13
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obtaining the following result0@ d11 l21d11 l31d11l21d11 l221d11 + d22 l21l32d22 + l32d22
l31d11 l21l32d22 + l32d22 l
2
31d11 + l
2
32d22 + d33
1A :
2.5.1 Generatization of DT factorization
Now, we can observe how to compute entries of matrices L and D. For the
diagonal matrix D we do the following
1  i  n : dii = aii  
j 1X
k=1
l2jkdkk
and for the L matrix, 1  i; j  n; i  j
lij =
1
djj
 
aij  
j 1X
k=1
likdkkljk
!
:
It's very similar to Cholesky factorization, computing starts with the com-
puting d11 and expanding row-wise from left to right. This algorithm requires
O(n3).
Algorithm 5 DT algorithm
1: procedure DT -factorization(b1; : : : ;bn 2 Rn )
2: d11  b11
3: for i = 1 upto n do
4: for j = 1 upto i do
5: if i = j then
6: dij  bii  
Pj 1
k=1 l
2
jkdkk
7: else
8: s bij  
Pj 1
k=1 likdkkljk
9: lij  s=djj
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: return L;D
14: end procedure
2.6 LQ decomposition
Denition 12 (Orthogonal matrix). Let Q 2 Fn;n. Matrix Q is orthogonal if
and only if QTQ = QQT = E.
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From denition 12 follows that, if a matrix is orthogonal then we can
interchange its transpose with its inverse, from these facts it's clear that
det
 
QTQ

= detE = 1.
Before computing LQ decomposition, which as a result returns two matrices
{ L a lower triangular matrix and Q which is a orthogonal matrix, is neces-
sary to introduce the QR decomposition, where Q is orthogonal and R is upper
triangular matrix.
The QR decomposition is introduced on a rectangle matrix A 2 Rm;n
where m  n. Factoring it into matrix Q 2 Rm;m and R 2 Rm;n and the
computation can be done in many ways including Gram-Schmidt. The most
of the variants are described in the publication of Golub and Van Loan [3].
The output of the QR decomposition produces an orthonormal vector basis
written in the rst n columns of Q.
To achieve the LQ decomposition it's only necessary to transpose the input
matrix A, because transposing A = QR will lead to AT = RTQT , and because
L = RT .
We will base the QR decomposition on the GSO. Let A = (a1; : : : ;an) 2
Rm;n be a column-wise matrix. Matrix Q = (q1; : : : ;qm) 2 Rm;m is a Q-factor
of a matrix A, and matrix R = (r1; : : : ; rn) 2 Rm;n is a R-factor of a matrix
A.
Recall the GSO from the 1 which will generate orthogonal basis (b1; : : : ;bn).
The Q-factor is constructed by placing orthonormal vectors qk = bk= kbkk
from the GSO in the columns. Q =
 
q1 q2 : : : qn

; and constructing the
R-factor as follows
R =
0BBBBB@
ha1;q1i ha2;q1i ha3;q1i : : : hanq1i
0 ha2;q2i ha3;q2i : : : han;q2i
0 0 ha3;q3i : : : han;q3i
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 0 han;qni
1CCCCCA :
Algorithm 6 QR decomposition based on GSO
1: procedure QR-Decomposition(b1; : : : ;bn 2 Rm)
2: (b1; : : : ;bn) Gram-Schmidt(b1; : : : ;bn)
3: for i = 1 upto n do
4: qi  bi = kbi k
5: for j = i upto n do
6: rji  haj ;qii
7: end for
8: end for
9: return (Q;R)
10: end procedure
15
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Thus producing the LQ decomposition is trivial.
Algorithm 7 LQ decomposition
1: procedure LQ-Decomposition(A 2 Rm;n)
2: Q;R QR-Decomposition(AT )
3: return (RT ;Q)
4: end procedure
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Chapter 3
NTRU
In 2017, Computer Security Resource Centre of National Institute of Stand-
ards and Technology (CSRC NIST) have called [6] for the papers for Post-
Quantum Cryptography Standardization. NTRUEncrypt, proposed by Jerey
Hostein et al., is one of many cryptosystems.
The NTRU (pronounced as en-tru) cryptosystem is can be formulated
using polynomials over rings. This cryptosystem was introduced in the 2006
in the paper of J. Hostein, et al. [7]. This part of the thesis is heavily reliant
upon the book of Hostein, et al. [4]
The main advantage against the other public key cryptosystems is that it
does not depend on the generating a pair of large primes, which takes up a lot
of time and all NTRU operations are quick { encryption, decryption, public
key derivation are done within O(N2) operations, where N is the dimension
of the lattice.
3.1 Polynomials
Denition 13 (Quotient ring). Let R be a ring and let m 2 R;m 6= 0. For
any a 2 R we write a for the set of all a0 2 R such that a0  a (mod m). The
set a is called a congruence class. We call R=(m) a quotient ring of R by m.
Denition 14 (Polynomial ring over Zq). Let q be a prime. Let R be a ring
and let m 2 R;m 6= 0. For any a 2 R we write a for the set of all a0 2 R such
that a0  a (mod m). The set a is called a congruence class. We call R=(m)
a quotient ring of R by m.
Denition 15 (Ring of convolution polynomials). Let N be a natural num-
ber. The ring of convolution polynomials of rank N is the quotient ring
R = Z[x]=(xN   1).
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Denition 16 (Ring of convolution polynomials modulo q). Let N be a nat-
ural number. The ring of convolution polynomials of rank N is the quotient
ring Rq = (Z=qZ)[x]=(xN   1).
Denition 17 (Convolution product of polynomials in a quotient ring). Let
a(x);b(x) 2 R. The convolution product of polynomials of degree N is a poly-
nomial c(x), such that
a(x) ? b(x) = c(x) where ck =
X
i+jk (mod N)
aibk i; 8i; j 2 0; : : : ; N   1
Denition 17 refers to classical product of two polynomials but there are
two additional operations { reducing the degree of a polynomial and, if ap-
plicable, reducing the coecients modulo q.
Example. Let a(x) = 1 + 4x + 2x4   5x6;b(x) = 1   7x   x2   6x3 and
N = 6; q = 13.
a(x) ? b(x) = 30x9 + 5x8 + 23x7   7x6   14x5   22x4   10x3   29x2   3x+ 1
= 30x3 + 5x2 + 23x1   7  14x5   22x4   10x3   29x2   3x+ 1
=  14x5   22x4 + 20x3   24x2 + 20x  6 in Z[x]=(x6   1):
Now we want to reduce the coecients modulo q = 13, so we get
a(x) ? b(x) = 12x5 + 4x4 + 7x3 + 2x2 + 7x+ 7 in (Z=13Z)[x]=(x6   1):
Lemma 7. Let q be a prime. Then a(x) 2 Rq has a multiplicative inverse in
Rq if and only if
gcd(a(x); xN   1) = 1 in (Z=qZ)[x]
and can be computed by Extended Euclidean Algorithm applied on polynomials.
Denition 18 (Set of ternary polynomials). For any natural numbers d1 and
d2 we dene a set of ternary polynomials T (d1; d2) as follows
T (d1; d2) =
8><>:
a(x) has d1 coecients equal to 1;
a(x) 2 R : a(x) has d2 coecients equal to   1;
a(x) has all others coecients equal to 0
9>=>; :
The set T is telling us how many coecients within any polynomial from
the set have value 0 or 1.
Denition 19 (Concatenating of two vectors). Let h(x) = a0 + a1x +    +
an 1xn 1;g(x) = b0+b1x+  +bn 1xn 1 be polynomials in Z[x]=(xN 1) then
we will compound a new vector (h;g) = (a0; : : : ; an 1; b0; : : : ; bn 1) 2 Z2n:
18
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3.2 NTRU cryptosystem
We can now start building a NTRU cryptosystem. We need to pick four
numbers (N; p; q; d) such that N is a prime, gcd(p; q) = gcd(N; q) = 1 and
q > (6d + 1)p. The last inequality is very important in order to successfully
decrypt the encrypted message.
It may not seem obvious why the very rst parameter must be a prime
number, it was proposed by Silverman to use the the power of two in or-
der to apply Fast Fourier Transformations, but it was discovered that if N
is composite then the NTRU cryptosystem is not secure.
The parameter N is used to dene the degree of polynomials to be at most
N 1, parameter q will be used to truncate the coecients of the polynomials
and parameter p is used for the decryption.
For illustration purposes we will refer to the Table 3.1 to demonstrate how
large these parameters according to [8].
Table 3.1: NTRU parameters
type N q p
Moderate Security 167 128 3
Standard Security 251 128 3
High Security 347 128 3
Highest Security 503 256 3
Because the NTRU is an asymmetric lattice-based cryptosystem, it re-
quires to have both public and private keys. Firstly, Alice publishes the men-
tioned four numbers and derives the public key from the private keys.
3.2.1 Public key derivation
In order for Alice to generate the public key, she must establish two polyno-
mials f(x);g(x) as follows f(x) 2 T (d+ 1; d) and g(x) 2 T (d; d). From these
private keys, she computes inverses
Fq(x) = f(x)
 1 in Rq and Fp(x) = f(x) 1 in Rp;
and Alice repeats this until she successfully established the inverses of the
key. Now, she computes h(x), which will be hers public key
h(x) = Fq(x) ? g(x) inRq
The vector (f ;Fp) is Alice's private key. She can, however, store only f
and compute Fp later.
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3.2.2 Encryption
Bob chooses a plain text (message)m 2 Rp and also chooses a random ternary
polynomial r 2 T (d; d) then he proceeds and encrypts the message with Alice's
public key h as follows
e  pr ? h+m in Rq:
3.2.3 Decryption
Denition 20 (Centered lift). Let a(x) 2 Rq. The centered lift of a polyno-
mial a to R is a unique polynomial a0(x) 2 R. Satisying a0(x) mod q = a(x)
whose integral coecients are chosen in the interval a0i 2 ( q=2; q=2].
Alice computes f ? e  pg ? r+ f ?m in Rq and centerlifts f ? e (and call
it a) then she computes
m  Fp ? a in Rp
.
3.2.4 The NTRU key recovery problem
Denition 21 (The NTRU Key Recovery Problem). Given h(x), nd a tern-
ary polynomials f(x);g(x) satisfying
f(x) ? h(x)  g(x) in Rq
It is important to note that the pair (f ;g) which solves the given problem
is not unique, another solutions are (xk ? f ; xk ? g); 8k 2 f0; : : : ; N   1g: The
polynomial xk ? f is called a rotation of f .
In order to brute-force this problem Eve would have to nd f or g go
through all ternary polynomials in a polynomial ring R, which consists of
#T (d1; d2) polynomials. We can compute the size of the set as follows
#T (d1; d2) = N !
d1!d2!(N   d1   d2)!
number of polynomials is maximised if d1 and d2 are approximately N=3.
However, because all rotations of a private key are a solution to the key
recover problem, Eve has to check approximately #T (d1; d2)=N polynomials.
3.3 NTRU lattices
In this section we are going to interconnect the lattice theory with the NTRU
cryptosystem.
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Denition 22 (Cyclical permutation matrix). Let h(x) = a0 + a1x +    +
an 1xn 1; a0; : : : ; an 1 2 Z be a polynomial of degree n. Then we dene a cyc-
lical permutation matrix Ph 2 Zn;n such that
Ph =
0BBBBB@
a0 a1    an 2 an 1
an 1 a0    an 3 an 2
...
...
. . .
...
...
a2 a3    a0 a1
a1 a2    an 1 a0
1CCCCCA
Denition 23 (NTRU matrix). Let h be a public key and Ph be its permuta-
tion matrix, E is an identity matrix and  is a zero matrix. Then an NTRU
lattice NTRUh is described by the matrix MNTRUk 2 GL2n(Z)
MNTRUk =

E Ph
 qE

Lemma 8. Let f ;g be private polynomials, which were used to generate the
public key h(x) Assume f(x) ? h(x)  g(x) in Rq and let u(x) 2 R be the
polynomial satisfying
f(x) ? h(x) = g(x) + qu(x)
Then
(f ; u)MNTRUh = (f ;g);
this means that (f ;g) 2 NTRUh and its rotations are the shortest vectors in
the NTRU lattice.
Now we will assume that d  N=3 and q  6d  2N . The Gaussian heur-
istic predicts the shortest nonzero vector in a lattice (NTRUh ) 
p
Nq=e 
0:484N . Because both vectors f and g have 2d coecients non-zero, result-
ing vector (f ;g) has approximately 4d non-zero coecients hence k(f ;g)k.
Therefore k(f ;g)k
(NTRUh )
 2:39p
N
;
so the vector (f ;g) is a factor of O(1=
p
N) than the Gaussian heuristic for
the shortest vector and thus vector (f ;g) is the shortest vector in a NTRU
lattice.
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Chapter 4
Symplectic and dual
orthogonalization algorithms
In the previous chapter we have demonstrated that NTRU cryptosystem
is based around lattices and the problem of orthogonality. However, we will
demonstrate in this chapter that NTRU lattices are actually q-symplectic.
Before we dive into the symplectic versions of orthogonalization algorithms
mentioned in the work of Gama [5], we shall explain the symplecticity, duality
and other variants.
4.1 Symplectic group, symplecticity, duality
Denition 24 (Isometry). Let X and Y be metric spaces with metrics dX and
dY . A map f : X ! Y is called an isometry (or distance preserving) if for
any a; b 2 X one has
dY (f(x); f(y)) = dX(x; y):
Denition 25 (Dual lattice). Let  be a lattice. We dene a dual lattice 
such as
 = fv 2 span; 8u 2  : hv;ui 2 Zg
Denition 26 (Quadrant notation). Let A;B;C;D 2 GLn(F) then we dene
Q[A;B;C;D] =

A B
C D

2 GL2n(F)
Denition 27 (Symplectic matrix). LetM 2 GL2n(F): and J = Q[0;En; En; 0].
We say that matrix is symplectic if and only if MT JM = J:
Denition 28 (Isodual lattice). A lattice  is said to be isodual if there exists
an isometry  of  onto its dual lattice.
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What the denition tells us is that between a lattice and its dual lattice
there is an isometry. A map that preserves the distances is useful in
Denition 29 (Symplectic lattice). Let  be a isodual lattice, and let  be
a isometry of . We say that lattice  is symplectic if and only if 2 =  1.
In other words, if there exists an orthogonal basis of span over which
the matrix of  is J then there is a basis  whose Gram matrix is symplectic.
A full rank symplectic lattice  has a volume of 1.
Denition 30 (q-symplectic lattice). A lattice  2 Z2n is q-symplectic if
and only if the lattice =
p
q is symplectic, where q 2 N0 and its volume is qn.
4.2 Symplectic LQ
We will implement the symplectic version of QR factorisation based on the
symplectic version of GSO.
Time complexity of this algorithm is exactly as in the case of Algorithm 9
O(n5 log2B)
Algorithm 8 Symplectic LQ algorithm
1: procedure SymplecticQR(b1; : : : ;b2n 2 Z2n )
2: (b1; : : : ;bn) SymplecticGram-Schmidtt(b1; : : : ;bn) . Algorithm 9
3: for i = 1 upto n do
4: qi  bi = kbi k
5: for j = i upto n do
6: rji  haj ;qii
7: end for
8: end for
9: return (RT ;Q)
10: end procedure
Theorem 3. Let G 2 GLn(Z) be a symmetric (positive) denite matrix and
 the DT factorisation of G. Let 0;0 = 1 and k;k = detGk where Gk
is the top left k  k block of G. Let  =   diag(1;1; : : : ; n;n) and U =
(T ) 1  diag(0;0; : : : ; n 1;n 1). Then the following holds:
 2 GLn(Z); U 2 GLn(Z);  = GU:
From the Theorem 3 follows the dual and symplectic version of the GSO.
4.3 Symplectic Gram-Schmidt
Symplectic version of the GSO devised in the paper of Gama [5] is specically
made for the q-symplectic matrices.
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Let B be a q-symplectic basis. Then L in LQ decomposition is also q-
symplectic, and  matrix corresponding to the GSO of B is also q-symplectic.
Let U be a dual integer matrix. Let Rn be a reversed identity matrix, that
is a matrix where the rows (or columns) are in reverse order, that is, on (i; j)-
th position is the Kronecker symbol i;n+1 j . and let denote quadrants of
matrices  and  as follows
 =

1 0
2 3

;  =

1 0
2 3

; and U =

U1 0
U2 U3

We have U1 = Rn3Rn for symplectic matrices and the following relation
for q-symplectic matrices U1 = diag(q
2; q4; : : : ; q2n)
This algorithm reduces the number of multiplications of the Dual GSO by
half.
Algorithm 9 Symplectic Gram-Schmidt algorithm
1: procedure SymplecticGram-Schmidt(b1; : : : ;b2n 2 Z2n )
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: precompute q2i
4: end for
5: for i = 1 to n do
6: Ui  i 1;i 1 (for all k, Uk represents Uk;i)
7: Ui 1   i;i 1
8: for j = i  2 down to 1 do
9: Uj =  
Pi
k=j+1 k;jUk

=j;j
10: end for
11: for j = 1 to i do
12: 2n+1 j;2n+1 i  q2(n+1 i)Uj
13: end for
14: for j = i to 2n do
15: j;i =
Pi
k=1Gj;kUk
16: end for
17: end for
18: return 
19: end procedure
This version of GSO runs in O(n5 log2B) where B is an upper bound of
kbik
4.4 Dual Gram-Schmidt
This and the symplectic version of GSO are the work of Gama, et al. [5],
both dual and symplectic versions are devised to minimise the number of the
divisions by getting around using Gram matrix and dual lattice.
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Let B = (b1; : : : ;bd) be a basis and G = BBT its Gram matrix. If 
is a GSO of B then G = DT where D is positive diagonal matrix. Rewriting
the previous equation as  = G(T ) 1D 1 we can compute the k  k topleft
triangle of (T ) 1D 1. Matrix (T ) 1 is the GSO of the dual basis B =
(bd; : : : ;b1).
Algorithm 10 Dual Gram-Schmidt algorithm
1: procedure DualGram-Schmidt(b1; : : : ;bn 2 Zn )
2: for i = 1 upto n do
3: Ui  i 1;i 1 (for all k, Uk represents Uk;i)
4: Ui 1   i;i 1
5: for j = i  2 downto 1 do
6: Uj =  
Pi
k=j+1 k;jUk

=j;j
7: end for
8: for j = i upto n do
9: j;i =
Pi
k=1hbj ;bkiUk
10: end for
11: end for
12: return 
13: end procedure
Algortihm 10 reduces the number of divisions against the Algorithm 2.
This version includes n2=2 divisions whereas integral Gram-Schmidt (n3).
4.5 Symplectic DT , Symplectic Cholesky
It was proven in the paper [5] that both DT factorisation and Cholesky
decomposition preserve the symplecticity of a matrix, however, in this thesis
their implementation is no dierent from their classical counterparts. Thus
for implementation details follow Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 4.
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Implementation
In this section we will describe the implementation and testing facilities used
within this thesis.
5.1 Programming language and libraries
 C++
We have decided on the native implementation in C++ with C++11
support enabled, which allows a wide variety of low-level optimisations.
It was also chosen for the reason that it is not transpiled or interpreted
language, which could negatively skew the results.
 Eigen
Eigen1 is a very popular library used for matrix manipulation and linear
algebra. It's used in TensorFlow2 library from Google used for machine
learning. It's entirely written in C++ with heavy use of templating
system which allows compiler to optimise the written code during the
compilation stage.
Also it has a builtin versions of algorithms and matrix manipulations
which are explicitly vectorised - the library itself tries to vectorise as much
as possible if such option is enabled.
 MPFR
Because of the high dimension lattices and the operations with large vec-
tors we will use MPFR 3 { Multiprecision oating computations library.
It relies on the GMP library internally. This library was chosen due to
simple, already existing binding for Eigen library.
1http://eigen:tuxfamily:org
2https://www:tensorflow:org
3http://www:mpfr:org/
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5.2 Generating random NTRU lattices
In order to test the variety of algorithms it's necessary to precompute dier-
ent NTRU matrices. However for our testing purposes we decided on ran-
domly generating public key using std::random_device in conjunction with
std::uniform_int_distribution generating random NTRU lattices which
had coecients randomly and uniformly distributed.
We decided on NTRU parameters (N; q; p) as follows q = 128; p = 3 and
N being primes from 5 to 103. We also generated multiple variants of NTRU
lattices in the same dimension, to get better results during testing.
All NTRU matrices are generated and stored in a separate text les.
Listing 5.1: A random public key generator
std : : vector<int> randomPublicKey ( int N, int Q)
f
std : : vector<int> r e s u l t (N) ;
std : : u n i f o rm in t d i s t r i b u t i o n<>
d i s t r i b u t i o n (0 , Q   1 ) ;
std : : random device rd ;
std : : de fau l t random eng ine eng ine ( rd ( ) ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < N; ++i ) f
r e s u l t [ i ] = d i s t r i b u t i o n ( eng ine ) ;
g
return r e s u l t ;
g
We shall describe the code listed above. The std::random_device rd
is our source of entropy, it is platform-dependant where and what the source
of the entropy is. In computers it's mostly some mathematical operation (most
likely a xor) of many hardware and software counters.
The std::uniform_int_distribution serves for our random engine is sort
of a lter, however it's not ltering, but distributing integers across the interval
(0; Q  1).
The std::default_random_engine is an algorithm, or more precisely,
a generator which implementation is also platform-dependent and generates
the random output based on the entropy it's given.
Using this algorithm we are able to generate random polynomials (repres-
ented as vectors in the code) in (Z=qZ)[x]=(xN   1).
5.3 Testing
Testing was done on a linux-based machine with Intel Core i5-6560U (2 cores,
4 threads) with base frequency of 1.8 GHz (2.8 GHz with TurboBoost tech-
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nology) equipped with 8 GB of RAM and Intel SSD 500p series.
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Chapter 6
Results
In this chapter we will cover the results of the experimental part.The following
results were achieved by running iterations over dierent matrices within the
same dimension and the results are averaged.
In the paper of Gama [5] they included tests on 128-bit long random integer
coecients in a rather large matrices (N  1000, remember matrices are
(2N)-dimensional) thus all our measurements on a small matrices (N  100)
resulted in quite surprising result { new algorithms mentioned in the research
paper are not suitable for low-dimensional sized NTRU lattices except for
Integral Gram-Schmidt as the whole purpose of the Dual and Symplectic GSO
is to prevent the multiplication and division of very large integers, which
involves other complex algorithms.
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Figure 6.1: Comparison of Gram-Schmidt family
We can clearly see from Figure 6.1 that both Symplectic and Dual Gram-
Schmidt are quite slow and are averaging on 4 seconds at lattices around
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dimension of 100. Both algorithms are resulting in O(n5 log2B).
However, from the Figure 6.2 we can clearly see that Integral GSO, which
has time complexity of O(mn2 log2(B)) is faster than the original one with
time complexity O(mn4 log2(B)).
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of Integral Gram-Schmidt and Gram-Schmidt
In the Figure 6.3 we can see a comparison between Integral GSO and
Cholesky decompostion. Cholesky decomposition has O(mn2) time complex-
ity and thus it is slightly faster than Integral GSO.
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of Cholesky decomposition and Integral Gram-
Schmidt
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Conclusion
The main aims of this thesis were mostly theoretical, extending and broad-
ening the knowledge of linear algebra and post-quantum cryptography on
a lattice-based cryptosystem, in this regard we was very successful.
We laid out the mathematics behind the lattices, dened two NP-hard
problems and described the NTRU cryptosystem. We connected orthogonal-
ization methods with the problems which are deeply related.
We developed the understanding between many new algorithms from linear
algebra was quite challenging, but also very interesting topic, we have learnt
where all the algorithms do nd a usage.
Some of the orthgonalization algorithms mentioned in the paper were not
improved at all, but they have been proven to maintain symplecticity, thus
even though they are implemented, they bring no benet at all.
This thesis may serve as an advancement of the research paper that it's
based on.
Future research
It may be useful to highlight where the future work may go. I suggest the
following:
 Measure more extensively algorithms with dierent size of coecients {
namely the size of the lattice and the q { modulus in a lattice.
 Exploring other implementations of QR factorisation and proving, or
disproving their symplecticity.
 Exploring other implementation possibilities of the Cholesky decompos-
ition.
 Explore newer, or other versions of lattice-based cryptosystem.
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AppendixA
Acronyms
CSRC Computer Science Resource Center
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
GSO Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalization
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AppendixB
Manual
B.0.1 Requirements
Because this implementation is based on a GMP library, it's necessary to have
a linux based operating system.
The list of supported algorithms by the program and the associated para-
meter (argument) for the command line execution.
 GramSchmidt (1),
 IntegralGramSchmidt (2),
 QR/LQ (3),
 Cholesky (4),
 LDL (DT ) (5),
 DualGramSchmidt (6),
 SymplecticGramSchmidt (7),
 SymplecticQR (8),
 SymplecticLDL (9),
 SymplecticCholesky (10)
In order to build the executable from scratch it's necessary to have installed
these dependencies
 libgmp-dev
 libmpfr-dev
 CMake version 3. or higher.
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AppendixC
Contents of enclosed SD
readme.txt.....................Instructions how to compile the sources
exe ..................................... the directory with executables
data......................................................datasets
tester ........................................... Linux executable
src...................................................... source codes
code............................code of the implemented algorithms
thesis..............the directory of LATEX source codes of the thesis
text..........................................the thesis text directory
thesis.pdf...........................the thesis text in PDF format
41
